A central concern about immigration is the integration into the labour market, not only of the first generation, but also of subsequent generations. Little comparative work exists for Europe's largest economies. France, Germany and the United Kingdom have all become, perhaps unwittingly, countries with large immigrant populations albeit with very different ethnic compositions. Today, the descendants of these immigrants live and work in their parents' destination countries. This paper presents and discusses comparative evidence on the performance of first-and second-generation immigrants in these countries in terms of education, earnings, and employment.
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It is widely believed that many European countries have a serious problem with the integration of immigrants and their children (see, for instance, LEED 2006). Many Northern
European countries have accumulated sizeable populations of immigrants, but the lack of longterm strategies and policies to integrate these into societal structures and the labour market is often cited as one reason for social and economic exclusion of the children of these immigrants.
Southern European countries like Spain and Italy have experienced in the past decade similar, if not larger, immigrations than the large Northern European economies France, Germany and the United Kingdom in the late 1950s to early 1970s. Again, it seems that there is little thought devoted to long term strategies for immigrants and their descendants.
The experience of those countries that had large-scale immigration in the last half of the twentieth century should be of importance for devising future immigration and integration policies. However, there is rather little hard evidence in the literature about the relative position of immigrants and their descendants in these countries, in a manner that allows comparisons to be made. In this paper, we aim to provide a comparative study of a number of outcomes (education, earnings, and employment) of both first-and second-generation immigrants of different origins in the three largest European economies: France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
There are a number of reasons why the integration of immigrants and their children matters. The more successful immigrants are in the labour market, the higher will be their net economic and fiscal contribution to the host economy. This in turn may be important for the attitudes of the native population to immigrants and, therefore, impact on immigration policy. On the other hand, poor economic success may lead to social and economic exclusion of immigrants and their descendants, which in turn may lead to social unrest, with riots and terrorism as extreme manifestations (as experienced by the United Kingdom and France at various times). What is the evidence on the social and economic integration of immigrants and their descendants? For Germany and the United Kingdom (and other countries) there is a fairly large literature comparing the economic outcomes of immigrants, immigrants' children, and natives. 2 Most papers focus on the estimation of economic assimilation patterns of first-generation immigrants, often concentrating on particular immigrant communities. Others investigate the outcome of second-generation immigrants. However, little work exists to date (Heath and Cheung, 2007 , being a notable exception) that presents economic and educational outcomes of immigrants in a way that allows comparisons across countries, as well as across generations. In this paper, we offer such a comparison, considering different outcome measures, such as education, earnings, and employment, which are indicative for economic integration. For France our analysis is almost the first on the topic, for the simple reason that the appropriate data had not been collected until very recently. 3 Although there are problems that make comparison difficult, we believe that our results add significantly to our understanding of the situation of immigrants and their children in Europe's largest economies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of immigration and assimilation policies in our three countries. We then discuss our empirical approach and the data used. Section 4 presents estimates of the degree of assimilation in education, earnings, and employment. Section 5 concludes.
2 For the United Kingdom, see, for example, Chiswick (1980) , Stewart (1983) , Bell (1997) , Modood et al. (1997) , Leslie and Lindley (2001) , Shields and Wheatley Price (2002) , Lindley (2002) , Blackaby et al. (2002 Blackaby et al. ( , 2005 , Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) , Clark and Drinkwater (2005) , Elliott and Lindley (2006) , Clark and Lindley (2006) , or Dustmann and Theoropoulos (2008) . For Germany, see, for instance, Pischke (1992) , Dustmann (1993) , Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993) , Licht and Steiner (1994) , Mühleisen and Zimmermann (1994) , Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) , Schmidt (1997) , Constant and Massey (2003) , Riphahn (2003) , or Fertig and Schurer (2007) .
3 Public authorities have long been reluctant to provide information on country of birth of parents in the main national surveys such as the Census or the Labor Force Survey. Previous studies were coping with this problem by using datasets with fewer observations and less comparable information relative to Labor Force Surveys from other countries -see Aeberhardt and Pouget (2007) and Silberman and Fournier (2007) .
A Brief Overview of Immigration and Assimilation Policy
The current situation of immigrants and their descendants can be thought of as being the result of immigration policy (how many immigrants to let into a country and from where) and
integration policy (what to do with immigrants and their descendants once they have arrived), though the use of the word 'policy' suggests a degree of planning and control that has often been conspicuously absent. Although our three countries have had very different immigration and assimilation policies (described below), there are common themes that emerge.
Immigration Policy
Some periods of high immigration are associated with conflict, generally elsewhere in the world. For instance, the end of the Second World War, which led to an entirely new geography of the European continent, saw 7.8 million refugees finding a new home in West Germany and 3.5 million refugees in East Germany by 1950 (Salt and Clout, 1976 
Assimilation Policy
The policy towards immigrants after arrival has been quite different in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, though one could argue there has been a marked convergence in recent years that we discuss below.
The United Kingdom is primarily associated with a multicultural approach 4 in which positive steps were taken to ensure that ethnic minorities experienced true equality. This led to early (by European standards) anti-discrimination legislation and a generally sympathetic attitude to allowing cultural and religious exemptions to laws and practices, e.g. allowing Sikh motorcyclists to wear turbans instead of helmets and Muslim policewomen to wear the hijab on duty. There was a widespread belief that by being hospitable to immigrants, they would, in return, come to feel part of the wider community. The reality was often different -there were riots in many British cities in the early 1980s and various organisations, notably the police, have been widely criticised for institutional racism. More recently there has been a feeling that this strategy has failed to create a common core of values, primarily because it offered minorities more than it asked from them in return and that some communities chose not to integrate into the wider society. For example, the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (the government body charged with fighting discrimination) argued in a TV interview that multiculturalism was leading to segregation, saying that "too many public authorities particularly
[are] taking diversity to a point where they [are] saying, ' actually we' re going to reward you for being different, we' re going to give you a community centre only if you are Pakistani or African Caribbean and so on, but we' re not going to encourage you to be part of the community of our town' ". The reaction has included substantive changes to policy -immigrants becoming citizens now have to pass a test on language, culture and history designed to mould their values into those deemed appropriate.
France also has a strong tradition of equality but the interpretation has been very different from that in the United Kingdom. French law provides for citizenship by right to anyone born on its soil, and nationality is generally conferred at the age of majority. Because all French citizens are to be treated equally under the Republican model, there has been a great reluctance to acknowledge any ethnic divisions. In addition, the strong secular tradition in the state (laïcité) has led to a restrictive attitude on the expression of religious and cultural identity in the public sphere, most famously in the 2004 ruling against the display of conspicuous religious symbols in school that, while worded as applying to all religions, would mostly affect those Muslim schoolgirls who wished to wear the hijab. One consequence of this refusal to acknowledge any minorities has been an inability to even know -due to a lack of reliable data -whether the reality of equality matched the rhetoric, leading to the accusation that serious problems were emerging but being ignored. Riots in various banlieues in 2005 brought these problems to widespread attention. But there have been changes in recent years. Anti-discrimination legislation was passed in 2001, and there have also been stronger requirements for immigrants seeking citizenship to show proficiency in the language and knowledge of the French culture.
We have benefited personally as this paper uses data from the French Enquête Emploi that only began asking about own and parental country of birth in 2005 as part of a general process of understanding more about the situation of immigrants in French society.
While both France and the United Kingdom enabled and indeed expected immigrants to become citizens and play a full and equal part in society, Germany took a different approach.
Until recently, eligibility for German citizenship was defined by descent rather than birth. As a consequence, the Volga Germans whose ancestors had lived in Russia since the 18 th century were regarded as German citizens, while the children of Turkish immigrants born in Germany were not. The first generation of immigrants were not expected to become citizens, primarily because they were expected to remain in the country only temporarily. But this became a problem when many immigrants did stay for long periods and had children who, though born in 
Methodology and Data
There are a number of measures one could use to assess the relative success of our countries of analysis in integrating their immigrant populations. One could simply compare the outcomes of the entire group of immigrants (and their children) to those of natives, pronouncing a country more successful if this gap is smaller. But, as we shall see, there is substantial heterogeneity in these outcome gaps within countries according to immigrants' country of origin. Such heterogeneity cannot be driven by differences in the host country policy and a different mix of immigrants across countries will thus lead to differences in this overall measure of integration. There are studies that attempt to compare the performance of immigrants from the same source country in different destination countries (for instance Adsera and Chiswick, 2007, De Coulon and Wadsworth, 2008) but the degree of overlap among the countries we consider is small.
We focus on the comparison of the gap between natives and first-and second-generation immigrants from different source countries. This is a good indication of how successful countries are at integrating immigrants in the long run -the second generation will have had all of their schooling in the host country and will almost certainly speak the language fluently. Because there are parental influences on children's outcomes, whether immigrant or native, one would 2 not expect all gaps to be eliminated but one would expect them to be reduced. 5 A similar approach for the US is taken by Card et al. (1998) and, for a number of countries, by Heath and Cheung (2007) .
We now turn to the description of our data sources and the way in which we distinguish first-and second-generation immigrants in each of our countries. For more details on the sample construction for each country, see Appendix A.
France
The 
United Kingdom
The data we use for the United Kingdom come from the British Labour Force Survey (UKLFS) for the period 1993-2007. The UKLFS contains information on country of birth for first-generation immigrants but no information on country of parental birth for the second generation. The standard practice, which we follow here, is to use ethnicity as a measure of being a second-(or subsequent-) generation immigrant. Therefore, the analysis of the descendants of immigrants is restricted to ethnic minorities, who (in the first generation) constitute roughly 50%
of the United Kingdom's immigrant population. For the sample period under analysis it is reasonable to assume that almost all of the non-white UK-born have at least one immigrant parent, though this assumption will become less true in future years. The standard classification of ethnicity has 14 categories from which we exclude the four mixed categories (that are mostly UK-born), and the three 'other' categories (other Asian, other black and other) as they are very heterogeneous. This leaves us with seven groups for our analysis -White, Indian, Pakistani, Black African, Black Caribbean, Bangladeshi, and Chinese.
Panel C in Table 1 reports the sample proportions for natives, first-generation immigrants, and second-generation immigrants for the United Kingdom. First-generation immigrants represent around 8.1% of the sample, of which more than half (56.8%) are of white ethnicity, 15.4% are from India and 8.6% from Pakistan. Only 1.6% of the population in the sample is made up of non-white second-generation immigrants, mostly of Indian (32.5%), BlackCaribbean (31.3%), and Pakistani (21.5%) ethnicity.
Before we come to the systematic regression analysis of the relative outcomes of first-and second-generation immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, we present unconditional average hourly wages and employment rates of men and women for both natives and the different immigrant groups in Table 1 . There is a lot of heterogeneity in outcomes across groups within countries so it is hard to summarize in a few sentences. Nevertheless, some clear patterns emerge. In terms of earnings, first-generation immigrants (both men and women) earn less than natives in France and Germany but not in the United Kingdom. The earnings of the second generation are similar to those of the first generation in France but markedly lower in
Germany with a more mixed picture for the United Kingdom. In terms of employment, firstgeneration men have employment rates similar to natives in France but lower than natives in Germany and the United Kingdom. Employment rates among first-generation women are generally lower than for natives. Employment rates for second-generation men seem generally lower than for the first generation (much lower in the case of the United Kingdom) while employment rates seem generally higher for second-generation women.
Two important characteristics not taken into account in these comparisons of the unconditional wages and employment rates are age and education. As documented in the second part of Table 1 , the second-generation immigrants are typically much younger than the firstgeneration and natives -this would tend to lower their unconditional wages. There are also differences in educational attainment. In general, the second-generation immigrants have higher levels of education than the first-generation -which in turn would tend to raise their unconditional wages. For this reason, we now turn to a more systematic regression analysis. 
Results
In this section, we report gaps in outcomes between natives and first-and secondgeneration immigrants for educational attainment, hourly wages, and employment. We start with educational attainment on the grounds that this is largely determined prior to labour market outcomes.
Education
As education is so crucial in influencing labour market outcomes in later life, it is of considerable importance how the educational attainment of first-and second-generation immigrants compares with that of natives. Because of the difficulty in comparing educational qualifications across countries, we use the age left full-time education as our measure of educational attainment. This measure seems the most comparable one available. 8 To this end, we regress the age at which an individual left full-time education on a basic set of characteristics.
We allow for different intercepts for first-and second-generation immigrants and these differentials are what we report. We run the regressions for first-and second-generation immigrants separately. Because some individuals in the sample (especially second-generation immigrants who tend to be young) have not yet completed full-time education we use a censored regression model with the variable "age left full-time education" censored at the current age for those individuals who are still students. 9 As education is also primarily a lifetime decision the only covariates we include in addition to the controls for immigrant status are a polynomial in the year of birth as well as region dummies. The results are presented in Table 2 .
France
The results for France are reported in Panel A of men, respectively, when they leave education while immigrants from the Maghreb and Asia are of about the same age. From the first to the second generation, the gap in educational attainment narrows for most immigrant groups, both for those who did initially better and for those who did initially worse. For instance, the negative gaps for Southern European and Turkish men decrease from -3.3 years to -0.7 years and from -3.2 years to -0.4 years, respectively.
Looking at women, we find that only first-generation women from Northern and Eastern
Europe are at least as old as native women when they complete their full-time education. All other groups are significantly younger than both native French women and their male immigrant counterparts. But there is an important improvement from the first to the second generation in terms of educational attainment, in particular among the groups which were the most disadvantaged in the first-generation. Second-generation Asian women are performing outstandingly well, with an edge of 2.6 years of education relative to native French women.
Germany
The results for Germany in Panel B of Table 2 show that all groups of first-generation immigrant men have significantly less education than native German men. The difference is particularly pronounced for immigrants from Germany's traditional guest worker countries.
While German men are on average 22.1 years-old when leaving full-time education (see Panel B
of Table 1 ), Turks are on average 3.5 years younger, Italians 3.4 years younger, Yugoslavs 2.9 years younger, and Greeks 2.7 years younger. "German" immigrants and first-generation immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe and other EU16 countries are only slightly less educated than native men. The educational attainment of immigrants improves substantially for the second generation. All groups of immigrant men with the exception of those from other EU16 countries finish their full-time education at an older age than their first-generation counterparts with the biggest improvements relative to native German men for Greek men (reducing the education gap from -2.7 years to -0.7 years) and Turkish men (reducing the education gap from -3.5 years to -1.9 years). 
United Kingdom
The results in Panel C of Table 2 The general conclusion that emerges from this is that any education gaps that exist for the first generation are generally being narrowed for the second so that education systems are not reinforcing inequalities that exist between natives and first-generation immigrants. Let us now consider the performance of the immigrants in their host countries' labour markets.
Earnings
We first turn to estimation of the earnings gaps between our immigrant groups and natives.
To identify gaps in earnings, we estimate simple earnings functions separately for men and women, using log net hourly wages as the dependent variable, controlling for a basic set of characteristics and allowing different intercepts for first-and second-generation immigrants.10
We report two specifications -in Table 3 we report estimates that include age left full-time education, a quartic of potential experience, region dummies, and time dummies as regressors. Tables 3 and 4 using the education differentials reported in Table 2 .
We restrict the way in which the earnings functions of immigrants and natives differ to be in the intercept. It may well be the case that there are differences in other coefficients, for instance different returns to experience and education, both acquired in the country of origin and the destination country. 11 We leave the exploration of this to future research -we simply do not have the space here to investigate this adequately. Finally, there are some characteristics of immigrants that may be very important in determining earnings but which we exclude. For the first generation language ability is almost certainly very important and other research suggests that time in the country seems to have an independent effect on earnings (Chiswick, 1978, being 10 For all countries, the data provides information on net monthly earnings and normal working hours per week. We construct an approximate log hourly wage measure by subtracting the log of normal hours worked from the log of net monthly earnings (weekly in the case of the UK). In principle, one would also have to subtract the log of weeks per month but this is a constant and will be captured in the constant term in the regression. Because earnings are right-censored, we estimate a censored normal regression for Germany.
the classic reference, but see also Borjas, 1985 , Dustmann, 1993 , 2000 , and Lubotsky, 2007 , for a discussion of the potential biases in these estimates). For the second generation, the factors driving earnings gaps may be different. There may be discrimination on the part of natives, it may be a reluctance to integrate on the part of the immigrant communities or it may be that the disadvantage of the first generation is, in part, carried over to the second generation. Again there is a limited amount we can do to tease out which of these factors is more important. Hence, our analysis should be understood as providing a first comparative overview on the wage situation of working first-and second-generation immigrants relative to natives. The results for each country are reported in the three panels of Table 3 .
France
Panel A in Table 3 reports the regressions of log hourly wages on age left full-time education, experience (quartic), regions and time dummies. There are only three groups of firstgeneration immigrant men that earn significantly less than comparable native men. These are immigrants from the Maghreb who earn 0.161 log points less, immigrants from Africa who earn 0.262 log points less, and immigrants from Turkey who earn 0.099 log points less. The change in the wage gap from the first to the second generation is very different for these groups. While in the second generation the wage gap for immigrant men from the Maghreb decreases by to 0.097 log points, it remains constant for immigrants from Africa and increases substantially by around 0.173 log points for immigrants from Turkey. This does not necessarily imply that second generation Turks earn less than first-generation Turks in absolute terms because, as we have seen in Table 2 , second-generation Turks have substantially better education and may thus overall still earn more than the generation before. However, compared to natives with the same educational attainment, they earn less.
For first-generation women, we see an overall similar pattern except that now Eastern
European women do badly while Turkish women do relatively well. First-generation women from the Maghreb and Africa earn significantly less than comparable native women, 0.089 log points and 0.227 log points, respectively. In contrast to Eastern European women they are not able to close the wage gap from one generation to the next. Interestingly, second-generation Asian women do extremely well, earning 0.345 log points more than their native counterparts.
But the sample of Asian women is very small so one should be cautious about drawing strong conclusions from this.
Panel A of Table 4 considers earnings differentials when we do not control for education.
Not surprisingly, the earnings gaps between natives and immigrants increase in magnitude for those countries of origin whose immigrants are less educated than the native French population and decrease in magnitude for those countries whose immigrants are better educated than the native French population. Unconditionally, all first-generation immigrant groups earn at least 0.13 log points less than natives, with the exception of Northern Europeans who earn significantly more, and Eastern European men and Asians who earn about the same as natives.
For the second-generation, the earnings situation has only improved significantly for men from Southern Europe, and women from Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Asia.
Germany
Panel B in Table 3 log points and from 0.081 log points to 0.175 log points, respectively. Overall we conclude that 2 although some immigrant groups manage to slightly reduce the wage gap to natives from one generation to the next, the wage assimilation is weak and there remains a substantial wage differential for all immigrant groups (with the exception of immigrant men from other EU16 countries and Former Yugoslavia) even in the second generation.
Panel B of Table 4 displays the wage differentials when we do not control for education.
As expected due to the immigrants' worse education levels, the wage gaps widen in magnitude for all groups with the exception of immigrants from other EU16 countries and women from Central and Eastern Europe. Overall, the unconditional wage gap is substantial, ranging roughly between 0.150 log points and 0.250 log points, and is particularly persistent across generations for both men and women from Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey, Italy, and Greece.
United Kingdom
The results for the first-generation immigrants in the United Kingdom reported in Panel C of Table 3 show the largest wage gaps of all three countries of our analysis. With the exception of ethnically white immigrants, all groups earn substantially less than their native counterparts with the gap ranging from 0.207 log points for Black Caribbeans to 0.530 log points (which translates into a 41% lower hourly wage) for Bangladeshis. From the first to the second generation, this wage gap narrows substantially across all groups and in particular for Indians (by 0.213 log points) and Bangladeshis (by 0.398 log points).
For first-generation women, wage gaps are not as large as they are for their male counterparts. On average the gap is around 0.2 log points with White and Black Caribbean women doing best with a gap of 0.063 log points and 0.087 log points, respectively, and Black
African women doing worst with a gap of 0.317 log points. Again, assimilation in terms of hourly wages is strong from one generation to the next with only Black African secondgeneration women facing a large wage disadvantage of 0.167 log points while the gap for all other groups is smaller than 0.05 log points.
Panel C of Table 4 considers earnings differentials when we do not control for education.
Although there a few exceptions (Black Caribbeans and first-generation Bangladeshis), Table 2 showed that all groups have more education than white natives. As a result, the earnings 5 differentials tend to be smaller when we do not control for education. For women, there are more immigrant groups with less education than white natives, so there is a more mixed pattern.
Comparison of Countries
It is interesting to compare the earnings gaps of first-and second-generation immigrants in our three countries. Fig. 1 presents one way of doing this -each point represents an earnings gap for the first and second-generation for one of our immigrant groups -observations relating to each country are labelled. The coefficients are those of the earnings gaps in Table 3 It is tempting to conclude that the earnings gaps represent the treatment of immigrants in the labour market but it is important to recognise that earnings gaps may also be affected by factors quite unrelated to the immigrants themselves. For example, Blau and Kahn (2003) point out that the gender pay gap tends to be larger in countries with more inequality because women are concentrated in the lower part of the earnings distribution. So, it may be that the relatively small earnings gaps in France are the result of low overall wage inequality especially in the bottom tail where the minimum wage is very high. To investigate this we did estimate models for being in the bottom quartile of the earnings distribution. The patterns of pay differences we found were very similar to those for net earnings so these results are not reported here. This suggests that general wage inequality is not the primary reason for our findings.
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Another possibility is that gaps in earnings are affected by differential selection into employment. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) show that the gender pay gap tends to be lower in countries with low female employment rates because low-skilled women are much less likely to work. It is possible that something similar is at work for immigrants. This is particularly pertinent because it is often argued that wage compression policies in France and Germany have had the consequence of reducing employment especially for the disadvantaged (though conditioning on education may take care of much of that). So, it may be that the low earnings differences in these countries (compared to the United Kingdom) come at the price of high employment differences. For this reason we turn to employment as an outcome.
Employment
The estimates in Table 5 report the marginal effects for being in employment from a probit model in which the included covariates are age left full-time education, a quartic in potential experience, region and time dummies. In the interest of brevity, we only report estimates for employment and do not distinguish between unemployment and inactivity though that distinction would be very important if one wanted to disentangle the roles of supply and demand in causing the employment differences we document. We also keep a very simple specification with the same regressors as we have used in the other Tables. We know that, especially for women, family structure (e.g. marriage and the number and age of children) is very important in explaining employment, with different effects for different groups. But we are primarily interested here in the overall differentials and do not dig so deeply into the reasons for the differentials we observe.
France
Panel A of 
Germany
The results for Germany in Panel B of Table 5 show that all groups of first-generation counterparts. Overall we conclude that employment gaps in Germany are relatively large, in particular for Turks and Central and Eastern Europeans, and, at least for men, do not appear to decrease from one generation to the next. Taken together with the earlier results on earnings, we find evidence that for those groups for which the employment gap is small such as Italy and Greece, the earnings gap tends to be large, pointing towards positive selection into employment.
United Kingdom
Panel C of Table 5 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented evidence on the experience of first-and secondgeneration immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. For France our estimates of earnings differentials are the first to be derived from the Labour Force Survey. We compare outcomes in terms of education, earnings and employment. For almost all countries and immigrant groups, second-generation immigrants have lower gaps in education than the firstgeneration. This perhaps suggests that the education systems are working to integrate the children of immigrants though it is much harder to say whether progress is as fast as it could be.
If it comes to labour market performance, we do not find similarly marked evidence of progress for all countries and for all immigrant groups. For net earnings, and conditional on education, potential experience and regional allocation, the United Kingdom stands out as having particularly large differences for the first generation but also much improved outcomes for the second generation. Evidence of progress in France and Germany is not so clear-cut. Employment gaps for men in Germany and the United Kingdom seem quite similar for first-and secondgeneration immigrants but France has a number of groups in which the second-generation immigrants seem to be doing worse than the first. For women, patterns are similar but there is clearer general evidence of a reduction in employment gaps for the second-generation.
Our research is a first attempt to provide a comparable picture on educational attainment and labour market performance of immigrant populations and their descendants in the three largest Northern European economies, based on the latest available data sources. The most important message of this work is perhaps that there is a clear indication that -in each countrylabour market performance of most immigrant groups as well as their descendants is -on average -worse than that of the native population, after controlling for education, potential experience, and regional allocation. There does not seem to be a very clear link between the outcomes for immigrants and the very different approaches to assimilation taken in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper calls for more detailed research to investigate the exact mechanisms that lead to the observed disadvantages and the way in which policy affects outcomes, which space and the requirements of comparability prevent us from doing here. Notes: These are the coefficients on dummy variables in a censored linear regression. The outcome variable is age left full-time education. The other covariates included are a polynomial in year of birth (for Germany only a quadratic), region dummies, and time dummies. Sample aged 16 to 64 including students for which the dependent variable is top-coded at the current age. Reported standard errors are robust. A (*) denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, a (**) at the 5% level, and a (***) at the 1% level. Table 5 .
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Appendix: Sample Construction
A1. France
The French data come form l'Enquête Emploi, which is the French Labor Force Survey Asia. The group of natives is defined as individuals who are born in the country and whose two parents were also born in France. First-generation immigrants are individuals born abroad and whose parents were both also born abroad and are from the same country of origin. Secondgeneration immigrants are individuals who are born in France but whose parents are both born in the same country abroad. Age left full-time education is calculated as the difference between the variable "Year left education" and the variable "Year of birth". Hourly wage is calculated by combining information from the two variables "Monthly net wage in the main (regular) job" and "Average weekly hours worked in the main (regular) job". Employment is calculated from the variable: "Activity: i) Employed, ii) Unemployed, iii) Non-active". We create a dummy variable equal 1 if the respondent is employed and 0 if she is unemployed or inactive. The sample is restricted to working age individuals aged 16 to 64. Earnings are computed by dividing weekly net earnings by weekly hours. The earnings questions in the LFS are only asked of those in waves 1 and 5 so sample sizes are smaller. Earnings information is not collected for the self-employed as they are excluded.
